18 July 2026

Criticism of the Attorney General's handling of the recent unduly lenient case

A post of 2 July considered the Court of Appeal judgment in the "unduly lenient" reference by the Attorney General - Law and Lawyers: The King and X Y Z (References under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988) [2026] EWCA Crim (845)

It was noted that -  

' ... the court made some comments about the administration of justice more generally. It expressed its concern about the inaccurate reporting and misinformed and inappropriate commentary by members of Parliament, the media and elsewhere that preceded this review and whilst legal proceedings were still ongoing. 

The court was particularly critical of the conduct of the Crown Prosecution Service, which published a formal press release following the sentencing hearing which they knew, or should have known, was neither a fair nor accurate representation of the factual basis for sentence. It was this inaccurate press release that appeared to be the root of the misconceptions that followed, in particular the misconception that the offending involved a knife-point rape and that C2 had been forced to give up her phone to avoid tracking. This portrayed the offending as even more serious than it already was. It took almost three weeks for the Crown Prosecution Service to correct the inaccuracies.

Whether

the court takes further action regarding the CPS remains to be seen. The judgment notes that -  'The Attorney General, ... , informed the court that ..... the CPS will be asked to provide the court and him with a full written letter of explanation. Upon receipt, the court will consider what further steps, if any, may be necessary.'

There is now a "follow-on" judgment - Approved Follow On Judgment - R v X Y Z - [2026] EWCA Crim 913.pdf

In paras 2 and 3 the Lady Chief Justice placed on record the judge's factual findings and commented

'Whilst the parties had access to the judge’s sentencing notes on the Digital Case System, which included the Factual Findings, it is unfortunate that full sentencing remarks were not made available to the press at the time of sentencing.'

There is still no explanation for that "unfortunate" failure to publish.

The "follow-on" judgment is particularly critical of the Attorney General - Lord Hermer KC.  

The court confined its observations to the way in which misinformation about the facts of the case AND the attacks on the trial judge were dealt with at and after the point at which the application for permission to refer these sentences to the Court of Appeal were issued, 1140am on 26 May 2026. 

The court's concerns were 

i) the lack of correction to the Factual Inaccuracies being reported, whilst at the same time speaking publicly about the gravity of the offending (and emphasising that he had read the full details) on 26 May and 29 May; 

ii) the lack of condemnation of the personal vilification of the judge at any stage ...,.

At para 42 the court said = " ...  the Attorney General chose to volunteer public comments on the gravity of the offending. In the podcast interview he professed detailed knowledge of the facts. If a member of government, and in particular the Attorney General, chooses to make public statements about the gravity of offending, and to refer to “understandabl[e]” “huge public concern”, then they should ensure that what is communicated is fair and accurate, correcting any widespread misreporting of which they are aware. Otherwise, they lend currency and endorsement to the mis-reporting. "

and at para 43 - "It therefore seems to us that in these circumstances it did fall to the Attorney General publicly to correct the Factual Inaccuracies – to protect the administration of justice, the safety of all involved (victims and offenders), and to underscore the cardinal importance of the public being given accurate information about what is happening in their justice system (good or bad). As we stated in our main judgment at [191], it is important to remember that those affected adversely by the mis-reporting were not only the boys, but also C2 in particular. As a result of the mis-reporting, the fact that her testimony (to the effect that she was forced at knife-point and forced to give up her telephone and Air-tag) was not accepted, has been the subject of wide publicity."

At para 44 the court turned to the personal attacks on the judge. 

"The Attorney General states that he was unaware of any security threats to the judge and would have acted differently, had he been so aware. But even if he did not know about specific threats, we consider that he must have known from the widespread commentary, including publicised comments from other prominent public figures, that the judge was under personal attack. He did come to know, not least from the contents of Mr Henry’s email of 28 May (which he saw on 3 June 2026), of the personal vilification of the judge. No one within government has said publicly, even now, that the attacks on the judge were improper and a threat to the independence of the judiciary." (My emphasis).

The court finally commented - "Standing back, these events demonstrate the importance of separating the exercise of powers under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 from politics. As we stated at [181] of our main judgment, the Attorney General exercised that power properly. But, as set out above, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that he associated the making of the References with government policy from the outset (see [6] above). The power to refer under section 36 is not vested in the government, but in the Attorney General who is to exercise it independently and not in pursuit of government agenda, however worthwhile. (My emphasis).

Security generally:

At apar 38 the court stated that the Attorney General indicated - "that he would very much welcome a more detailed discussion about how the judiciary and the government work together, within our appropriate constitutional lanes, to meet our shared and grave concerns about increasing attacks on judges. This is a positive suggestion which the judiciary would likewise welcome."

Whether such security is actually the in the Attorney General's "lane" is not clear to me but it would certainly be within the remit of the Ministry of Justice (headed by the Lord Chancellor) in conjunction with other appropriate government departments).

It is particularly disappointing that a government, headed by a lawyer Prime Minister, did not act to deal with the attacks on the judge.

It is also noteworthy that the Lord Chancellor also failed to protect the independence of the judiciary. He was certainly "conspicuously silent."

A new Prime Minister:

At the time of writing a new Prime Minister is about the be appointed by HM The King. Once appointed, the new PM is entitled to form a government. It remains to be seen whether Lord Hermer and David Lammy will be part of it.

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